ON Saturday, those living in Peninsular Malaysia will
commemorate achieving independence 56 years ago. Increasing dissonance
over films like Tanda Putera and New Village as well as videos on dogs
should prompt this question: why is Merdeka a cause for celebration?
Freedom from British rule is indeed reason for festivity.
Often overlooked is the remarkable achievement by then leaders of
Umno, MCA and MIC – building a political structure of multiracial
cooperation. This seminal achievement was under-girded by three factors.
First, to reach agreement on the constitutional framework, Tunku
Abdul Rahman, Tun Tan Cheng Lock and Tun Sambanthan had to act as
Malayans rather than as leaders of their ethnic communities.
Second, the friendship and trust that all three shared helped to
overcome the difficulties they faced during the often fraught
negotiations.
Third, as presidents of Umno, MCA and MIC, all three leaders
succeeded in persuading their supporters to refrain from adopting a
winner-take-all attitude.
Is this spirit of multiracial cooperation, trust as well as give-and-take evident 56 years ago still prevalent today?
With the benefit of hindsight, independence for this country appears a
given. But even as late as 1955, there was no such certainty.
During a visit to Malaya in 1951, Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton
impressed on Umno leaders there would be no independence until the
races of Malaya had forged unity, historian Tim Harper wrote in his
book, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya.
Critics today may complain about Tunku giving citizenship to one
million non-Malays. During the Merdeka negotiations, MCA had asked for
jus soli as a basis for citizenship for non-Malays. Jus soli endows
citizenship for those born in this country.
Another fractious issue was the role of Chinese and Indian schools in this country.
Similarly, MCA presidents Cheng Lock and his son, Tun Tan Siew Sin
have been pilloried for agreeing to the continuation of the special
rights for the Malays and accepting Bahasa Malaysia as the national
language.
Conveniently disregarded is failure to reach agreement on these
critical issues – citizenship for non-Malays, continuing the special
rights for the Malays and Bahasa Malaysia as the national language and a
continuing role for vernacular schools – could have jeopardised the
over-arching goal of achieving independence.
Would critics of the Tunku have preferred Malaya continue to be
governed by the British rather than giving citizenship to non-Malays?
Similarly, would the majority of Chinese and Indians favour staying in this country as non-citizens?
Some may contend independence for Malaya was a question of "when", not "if". This contention overlooks two facts.
First, in August 1947, Britain granted India independence and
partitioned it into two countries. That the chaotic mass migration of
between 10 million and12 million people resulted in an estimated one
million deaths would have seared into British policymakers' perception
that multi-religious harmony was a mirage.
Second, on July 23, 1948, an Emergency was declared in Malaya. This
insurrection by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) caused tremendous
hardship in this country.
Many planters and high-profile individuals became assassination
targets. In August 1949, a hand grenade was thrown at Cheng Lock whom
the MCP labelled the "Number One Big Dog of the British Imperialist".
Although seriously injured, he survived.
For the Chinese living in remote areas, the Emergency led to a concerted effort to re-settle them.
A survey by K.S. Sandhu estimates nearly 572,917 Chinese were
re-located in 1954 to 480 new villages. Harper writes a later survey
indicates a larger number – 620,785 Chinese – were transplanted to 592
new villages.
Whatever the number, life in these new villages was a misery. While
the MCP's description of the new villages as "concentration camps" may
be an over-statement, the London Times described these re-settlers as
living in "urine-tainted poverty, made tolerable only by the sun."
Although the colonial government incurred budget deficits because of
the Emergency, spending on social services in the New Villages was
paltry. By 1952, of the US$67 million spent on resettlement, only 8% was
spent on social services and amenities, Harper notes.
In 1953, the World Bank estimates the annual cost of the Emergency
peaked at US$250-270 million. This sum excluded the cost of the police,
British and Commonwealth forces which Harper suggests added another
US$100 million to the tab while the tin industry spent another US$30
million.
Furthermore, the Emergency also spurred capital flight. From US$16
million in 1949, the amount sent abroad swelled to some US$130 million
two years later while Harper reckons the private non-banking sector was
responsible for a wholesale capital exodus of another US$300 million.
Without Merdeka, would the Emergency have ended with a whimper instead of more big bangs?
Amid Merdeka celebrations, can Pensinsular Malaysians recapture the multiracial harmony that was endemic 56 years ago?